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This paper is not what its published title promises. It
is not an exploration of the place of virtue in the
professional life of the health care provider. Rather,
this is the preamble to such a paper. It is an attempt
to sort through my own disquietude about current
theory in biomedical ethics. I have tried to do this
sorting by reviewing and pulling together the threads
of a number of the more compelling, recent critiques
of prevalent ethical theories. Basically, I am trying
to answer three questions:

What prompts me to

think there is a problem? Who else thinks there is a
problem?

And, what are the general parameters of

this problem?
But, I begin with a little history-In the 1973 annual oration of the Society for Health
and Human Values, Edmund Pellegrino advocated a
new rapprochement
medicine,

between

between
Minerva

philosophy

and

and Aesculapius.

Pellegrino foresaw mutual benefit resulting from this
rapprochement.
intelligence

Philosophy could reinfuse "critical

into medical

thought, practice,

and

education. " It could enable the new medicine to
develop

a "'new'

potentialities."

1

value

system

to match

its

And medicine, he hoped, could be
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instrumental in philosophy's reclaiming its role as a
"significant factor in culture. "2 High hopes!
Almost ten years later, in 1982, Stephen Toulmin
concludes in his article, "How Medicine Saved the
Life of Ethics," that the "interaction with medicine,
law, and the other professions (in the 20 years prior)
has had spectacular and irreversible effects on the
methods

and content

of philosophical

ethics."

Toulmin continues,
By re-introducing

into ethical debate the vexed topics raised

by particular cases, they have obliged philosophers to address
once again the Aristotelian problems of practical
which had been on the sidelines too long.

reasoning,

In this sense, we

may indeed say that, during the last 20 years, medicine has
'saved the life of ethics', and that it has given back to ethics a
seriousness and human relevanc which it had seemed--at least,
in the writings of the interwar years--to have lost for good. 3

Not everyone in philosophy has appreciated either
this "new rapprochement"
Not everyone

or this "resuscitation."

in philosophy

has welcomed

the

preoccupation with practice or "clinical ethics", with
the emergence
professional
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of physicians

"upstarts"

or other

attempting

health

to "do" ethics

without philosophical portfolio.
Nor has everyone in medicine taken kindly to the
intrusion of philosophy and philosopher/ethicists into
the medical education curriculum, into the hospital
committee structure, or onto the patient bedside.
Nonetheless,

both philosophy

and medicine have

reaped some harvest from this cross fertilization.
But is the harvest of the sort that Pellegrino and even
Toulmin anticipated?

Has philosophy given order

and a viable value system to medicine?

Has

medicine truly humanized philosophy and returned it
to cultural significance?
If we were to use bibliographies as an indicator of
the extent to which the "critical intelligence"

of

philosophy has been infused into medical thought,
practice,

and education,

we would declare

the

rapprochement a success. The literature of what has
come to be known
voluminous.

as "biomedical

New special journals

ethics"

is

have been

developed

and innumerable

published.

The sources of all of this scholarship

include

both philosophical

professionals,

books
ethicists

some with formal

have been
and health

education

in
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philosophical ethics or bioethics, and some without
The number of textbooks available provide evidence
of the proliferation of academic courses or programs
over the past twenty years. Ethics rounds have been
established in clinical settings to enable students and
practitioners alike to cultivate their sensitivities to the
moral dimension of their practice and to sharpen their
skills at addressing the moral problems that they
face. However, even with all of this education and
this published philosophical reflection on the practice
of medicine and the delivery of health care, I believe
that vexing,

fundamental

problems

remain about this rapprochement.

and doubts

Now, perhaps,

even more than at the time twenty years ago when
Danner Clouser first made the observation,

this

"mixed

and

marriage"

of philosophical

ethics

medicine is in need of counseling.4
The doubts about this relationship are of two related
sorts and they go to the heart of Pellegrino's
expected outcomes of the "new rapprochement".
First, there are doubts about the applicability
philosophical theory to medical practice.
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Second, there are related or consequent doubts about
the adequacy of the present ethical theories that we
are attempting to apply to medicine.

These are not

simply doubts that the deontologist might have about
the utilitarian or vice versa. Rather, these are, for the
most part, doubts about the adequacy of the sort of
ethic that has evolved to address the complex ethical
challenges of medicine.
For the most part, the first of these doubts, those
about the applicability of theory to medical practice
arise from observing the practice of philosophical
ethics; and those doubts about the suitability of the
prevailing medical ethic or value system arise from
observing the practice of medicine or health care. Let
us look now at how some of these doubts are being
articulated in the current biomedical ethics literature.
I'll begin with the fIrst of these misgivings.

Albert

Jonsen has long been skeptical about our ability to
link specific practice or particular moral judgments to
ethical theory. In a recent review of the 1989 edition
of the Beauchamp and Childress textbook, Principles
of Biomedical

Ethics, Jonsen notes that he is not

alone in his skepticism. Jonsen points out that in the
three successive re-editions of the Beauchamp and
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Childress text the authors express a diminishing
confidence in our ability to find a higher-order ethical
theory from which middle-level

principles can be

derived and to which we can appeal in making
particular moral judgments.S
Jonsen and others, including, probably, any number
of medical ethics instructors who use case method,
describe a phenomenon that has prompted some of
the doubts about the significance

of theory for

practice. They observe that when groups of people
discuss and attempt to resolve particular

moral

dilemmas or cases studies, advocates of diverse,
even opposing, ethical theories often come to the
same conclusion or practical judgment.

Jonsen uses

the example of the deliberations of the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine to illustrate this phenomenon--this ability to
achieve consensus around specific cases in spite of
differences in theory. 6
In his book, The Abuse of Casuistry:
Moral Reasoning,

A History of

written with Stephen Toulmin,

Jonsen proposes a return to the use of casuistry; that
is, a return to arguing
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or deciding

a particular case

based on prior cases or precedence, as in the practice
of common-law.

lonsen sees casuistry as a viable

and defensible alternative to the often times fruitless
traditional practice of deducing moral practice from
ethical theory.
However, lonsen and Toulmin's pragmatic solution
presupposes

some common moral intuition and a

common cultural framework in order to successfully
argue cases. But as George Annas and other critics
of casuistry have pointed out, "Part of our current
malaise is that we appear to lack such common
ground. "7

Although lonsen's

solution is not a

totally convincing one, his search does underscore
our inability to cleanly link practice to some one
higher order theory which we all affInn.
Leon Kass, in a recent article marking the twentieth
anniversary of the Hastings Center, also presents a
sweeping critique of the practice of biomedical ethics
today and puzzles

over its relationship

to the

everyday practice of medicine or health care.8 In his
critique,

Kass

applicability
medicine.

voices

doubts

and the suitability

about

both

the

of the ethic of

For Kass our problems with application
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of theory are a consequence

of the nature of the

theory we are trying to apply. How, Kass wonders,
can our current, highly rationalistic

philosophical

ethics--given to abstractions, to rules or sometimes
guidelines-- facilitate moral decisionmaking

in the

often complex, sometimes critical and confusing,
sometimes

routine

and

frustrating,

always

contextual, daily practice of medicine and health
care?
Philosophical ethics today, Kass contends, as do I,
is not only rationalist but "hyper-rational." He states:
The dominant mode of American philosophizing today remains
analytic. It concerns itself with the analysis of concepts, the
evaluation of arguments, and the criticism of justifications,
always in search of clarity, consistency, coherence. It spends
little time on what genuinely moves people to act--their
motives and passions:

that is, loves and hates, hopes and

fears, pride and prejudice, matters that are sometimes dismissed
as nonethical or as irrational because they are not simply
reducible to logos.9

"Rationality at work," Kass notes further, "is above
all a problem-solver." And rationalistic philosophical
ethics, in its approach to medicine and health care,
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isolates and focuses on problems which it abstracts
and analyzes.

The problems

most appealing for

such analysis are the problems of extremes. So, the
"morality of ordinary practice,Kass

observes,

"is

largely ignored."IO Further, in so far as the problem
solving process is rigorously rational, the solutions
are often "purely rational" rules to govern conduct,
or ideals toward which we should strive.

"The

methodical

rationality

Kass

complains,"

is put in place of the discerning

of procedure,"

reasonableness of the prudent man-on-the-spot that
all real choices demand." 11 In addition, our current
theory too often leads us away from the confounding
moral complexities of our medical practice, to search
for simple, clean, minimalist principles--autonomy or
benevolence, and the like.

Other participants in and observers of medical and
health

care practice

perspectives,

Kass's

echo,
critique

from

a variety

of

of a rationalistic

approach that can deal only with abstractions or with
ideals, or with clear cut rules logically applied.
Clinicians are confronting

increasing numbers of

disconcerting medical or health care practice issues
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that are not readily or suitably resolved with such an
approach. Let's look at some of these examples.
Some of them, I should note, have arisen as a
consequence

of our incredible

medical and biological

achievements

technology

in

and research

(once again validating the warning that "... today's
achievement

is only tomorrow's

confusion").

In

looking at these practice issues, I will focus on only
one of the central ethical principles in biomedical
ethics, i.e., autonomy. And the practice issues to
which I will refer will be limited to: 1) the care of
impaired elderly and the decisionally incompetent, 2)
the cost of and access to health care, and 3) the
treatment of persons with AIDS. My purpose is not
to defend or deny the solutions provided by the
authors presented but rather to point up the problems
that they identify, most of which I also recognize as
such.
Autonomy in biomedical ethics in the U.S. has been
pivotal--even sacrosanct. The practical application of
the traditional notion of autonomy to the everyday
care of the impaired

elderly or of persons in a

persistent vegetative

state has left clinicians and

ethicists alike unsettled. Several recent authors have
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identified and attempted to address the limitations of
the principle of autonomy as it has been articulated or
interpreted to date.
James Childress, in the past a dedicated proponent of
autonomy,

has attempted in a recent article to re-

articulate its meaning.

Autonomy, Childress now

informs us, is complex because real persons are
complex; they are not idealizations or abstractions.
There can be no simple or, as he puts it, "no
mechanical application of a clear-cut moral principle"
here.

Sometimes

autonomous

when we make a supposedly

choice, we don't know what we are

choosing,

sometimes

we contradict

ourselves,

sometimes

we change our minds, sometimes we

choose one thing but really would choose another if
we weren't being intimidated--and this applies to you
and me and not only to the impaired elderly or others
who are decision ally incompetent.12

The patient's

history, values, and context, Childress asserts, must
be considered when trying to determine if an act is
autonomous.

The autonomous individual is not an

abstraction.
George Agich, moves the discussion of autonomy
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even more emphatically from the realm of abstraction
into the realm of daily reality. "Traditional treatments
of autonomy,"

Agich observes,

"simply abstract

from actual examples of finite human autonomy and
context of choice and focus instead on idealizations
of autonomous action and choice." 13 Agich calls
for, i.nstead, a "refurbished,

concrete concept of

autonomy that systematically attends to the history
and development of persons and takes account of the
experiences of daily living."14 "Actual" (in contrast
to "ideal") autonomy, as Agich defmes it, is complex
and "clearly less neat" than the traditional view. For
him, "Expressions of (actual) autonomy are ... the
playing out of who the individual is as well as who
the individual is becoming; the field or state for such
'playing out' is the social world of everyday life." 15
In addition,

Agich contends

that to understand

autonomy one must understand how individuals are
interconnected. We must understand, also, the place
of habit in daily life.

We must understand

that

habitual actions, if consistent with one's self-identity
are as autonomous as those actions that arise from
"reflective,

deliberative

decisionmaking.16

cannot be denied or dismissed.
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They

John Hardwig,
Family?,"

in his article

explores

interconnectedness

"What about the

even further
in autonomy,

this notion of
especially

as it

relates to the impaired elderly or the decisionally
incompetent.

In the traditional or idealized view of

autonomy, individualism is central, relationships or
interconnectedness

are peripheral or less. Hardwig

observes, however, that
The way we analyze medical treatment decisions by or for
patients is plainly anomalous to the way we think about other
important decisions family members make. I am a husband, a
father, and still a son, and no one would argue that I should or
even responsibly could decide to take a sabbatical, another job,
or even a weekend trip solely on the basis of what I want for
myself. Why should decisions about my medical treatment be
different?

Why should we have even thought that medical

treatment decisions might be different? 17

Hardwig warns that to adhere to an individualistic,
disconnected concept of autonomy in medical ethics
will serve only to isolate the individual patient more
and to diminish

the role

and importance

of

relationships and of comrnunity.l8
Let us continue to look at autonomy but move now
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from concerns related to the care of the impaired
elderly and the decisionally incompetent to the issues
of health care cost and access.

Concerns-- if not

panic-- about the cost of medical and health care and
the allocation of these resources are also leading
theorists to try to re-articulate or revise the traditional
view of autonomy.
advocating,

A number

as I have

consideration
community.

of

our

noted,

of critics

a return

are

to the

interconnectedness

or

One example of such an attempt is

presented by Danis and Churchill in their article,
"Autonomy and the Common Weal."19 The authors
review the current critical state of access to health
care and examine, as well, the debate about the role
that the individual

physician

should

play

in

addressing the cost issue. Should the physician be
society's

gatekeeper

to health

care resources,

especially those that are costly? Some clinicians, like
Pellegrino, declare that the physician must be the
advocate
physician

of his/her patient
ought

solely and that the

not be, simultaneously,

instrument of social justice.

an

If one follows this line

of thought, considerations of the cost of diagnostic
or treatment modalities

should not enter into the

physician's deliberations when treating an individual
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patient. Others, however,

consider this bracketing

of cost issues as irresponsible and contributing to the
growing cost and access crisis. Danis and Churchill
suggest

that perhaps

both sides are somewhat

correct. They recommend a "new integrated moral
framework"

to resolve this conflict.

The authors

propose a concept of citizenship to undergird this
new framework--not an altogether original concept.
Both the physician

and the patient, the authors

contend, must see themselves, and accept their role,
as citizen. As citizens, both belong to "something
larger than self, or (their) particular

individual

relationships." This larger than self perspective must
balance

the

perspective

of the

autonomous

individual.
Certainly, this proposed new framework is not .till:
total answer to the crisis over health care access and
cost, but its suggestion does, again, underscore the
inadequacy of a principle of autonomy that isolates
the individual.
Most of the examples that I have just reviewed deal
with the growing realization that our ethical theory
deals too much with abstractions or ideals.

More

specifically, in the cases reviewed, it deals with the
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"ideal autonomy"
abstraction

or with the individual

as an

rather than with the actual and the

concrete. What has been suggested in varying ways
by the authors reviewed, is a principle of autonomy
that recognizes and respects the history, context, and
interconnectedness of the person who is patient.
There is yet another important facet of the rationalism
of our prevailing biomedical ethical theories that we
must consider.

It is the emphasis on principles and

rules, rights and obligations, and the de-emphasis on
the consideration

of those factors that truly move

people to act morally.

Kass observes

that the

rationalistic approach,
speaks little about motives and attitudes, and still less does it
concern itself with figuring out how to get people to do what
theory says is best. Universalist in conception, it cares little
for the variety of human types, some move by the love of
gain, others by the love of honor, some by reverence, others
by fear, still others by pleasure. In short, it treats the rational
content of speech and argument without regard to the engaged
concerns that incite both speech and action. It by and large
ignores mores and customs, sentiments and attitudes, and the
"small morals" that are the bedrock of ordinary experience and
the matrix of all interpersonal relations.

It by and large

ignores real moral agents and concrete moral situations,
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preferring

the abstraction

of the hypostatized

"rational

decisionmaker" confronting the idealized problem needing to be
solved ... Though originally intended to improve our deeds, the
reigning

practice

of ethics,

if truth be told, has, at best,

improved our speech.20

If we do indeed want an ethics that enables us to
make a practical moral difference, then we must be
concerned about moving both the patient and the
provider to action. Any number of other theorists,
past and present, have troubled over this challenge,
as well.
In current medical and health care practice, the
conflicts that have arisen over the care of persons
who are HIV positive or who have AIDS have forced
this challenge

to the forefront.

Is an ethic of

obligation and rights that also stresses autonomous
individualism

adequate to moving providers to act

responsibly in the face of the AIDS epidemic.
In a 1987 article, Abigail Zuger, a physician who did
her residency

training in the wards of Bellevue

Hospital in New York City, aptly addresses these
"physician-oriented"

ethical issues.

"Is a physician
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ethically obliged to care for a patient with AIDS?
What does the care of these patients do to the
physician's training, practice, and quality of life?"
Zuger asks)!
It is the case that a number of physicians, dentists,
residents, nurses, respiratory therapists, and others,
have explicitly refused to treat or to care for persons
with AIDS or with

mv infection.

Zuger points out,

however, that there are many more subtle forms of
refusal to treat. She describes the AIDS patient who
is never visited on morning rounds for any number
of specious reasons-- "there's nothing new to say; all
the students upset him; the intern will come back and
talk to him later." Or there is the person with AIDS
in the emergency room whom caregivers delay in
seeing--procrastinating

because

they know the

difficulties to be faced.

And, the author observes,

"Probably most common of all. .. are the refusals
that never take place," because interns, residents,
physicians,

and other health professionals

simply

avoid training or practicing in facilities in which they
may have to provide care for persons with AIDS. As
the epidemic
avoidance
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spreads,

however,

this form

of

will be more and more difficult

to

accomplish.

I would add the personnel shortage

crisis we are experiencing
technology--some

in the field of medical

of which has been attributed to

AIDS--as another example of refusal to care.
The reluctance

of physicians

and of other health

professionals to care for patients with AIDS,

Zuger

reports, can be ascribed to a number of difficulties
that must be faced in delivering that care. Fear of
infection,

although the most frequently

cited, is

perhaps the least important, she notes. Some of the
other difficulties in delivering care relate to the nature
of the various diseases called AIDS. For example,
these diseases can be palliated but seldom cured; they
are debilitating, depressing, and often times ugly-causing, in varying cases, unrelenting diarrhea, skin
lesions, physical wasting, neurological impairment,
blindness,

and unremitting

pain; their treatment

requires esoteric knowledge that is rapidly changing;
and the care required is time consuming, requires
inconvenient
sophisticated.

precautions

and

is technically

Other causes of the reluctance to care

relate to the AIDS patient. As Zuger notes, "These
needy, time-consuming patients are all too frequently
persons whom many physicians

(and other care
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providers) have inherent difficulty in accepting."22
They may be gay, IV drug users, or prostitutes-ready targets,

even precluding

misunderstanding

the disease,

for

at best, as well as acrimony and

blame. It is within this context that the question of
the responsibility of and the motivation for the health
care professional to provide care is raised.
Zuger does not give a definitive response to her
original question about the ethical obligation to treat.
Rather she describes the full spectrum of responses
that have been made by individual physicians and
those that have been counseled

or mandated by

various physicians groups. Interestingly, she entitles
this section of her article "A Spectrum of SelfSacrifice." Zuger includes both the joint statement of
the American

College

of Physicians

and the

Infectious Disease Society of America, issued in
early 1986 and the AMA statement issued in late
1986.

The former is brief and clear:

"denying

appropriate care to sick and dying patients for any
reason in unethical." The latter hedges: it allows that
"not everyone is emotionally able to care for patients
with AIDS."
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To my mind, given all of "the parameters

(the

difficulties and constraints) that define the medical
care of patients with AIDS," as Zuger and others
have experienced and articulated them, an ethics of
rights and obligations, of autonomous individualism,
cannot alone make a practical moral difference or
move the health professional to act responsibly.

I

believe that looking at the delivery of care for the
elderly in long-term care facilities prompts the same
sort of conclusion.

Some of the same parameters

exist in the context of the care for this population as
in the care of persons with AIDS.
From my own observation of clinical practice, both
with AIDS patients and the impaired elderly, Iknow
that the health care provider needs more than a sense
of duty or obligation just to sustain him or her. I
know, too, that to treat or to provide care for the
AIDS patient or impaired elderly resident, the health
care provider will need patience, endurance, courage,
loyalty, prudence, considerateness, to mention just a
few virtues or moral habits.
With some few exceptions

- such as Pellegrino,

Drane, Kass - these characteristics

or virtues are

seldom, if ever, brought up in our discussions of
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rights and obligations.

We shy away from speaking

of virtue and character,

even in our educational

process. We fear it will sound like moralizing.
fear the accusations
abandoning

of not being "rational" or of

philosophical

some standard

We

rigor as we search for

of the "good" against which to

measure our virtue and our character. Yet, in terms
of making a moral difference, these virtues may well
be essential.
They make a difference

to both the health care

provider and to the patient. I can recall observing the
manner in which various LPNs cared for my father
during his stay in a long term care facility before his
death. He was fragile; I worried that they would not
be attentive

or caring.

I wanted

them to be

considerate and patient and loyal to him. I wanted
my father to be more than an "obligation" for them. I
wanted them to realize that he was more than a
"bearer of rights", as Cohen has put it, that he
"should receive gestures that confer respect." 23
From my own observations
know that in addition
obligations
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and

the

of clinical practice, I

to a realization
need

for virtue,

of one's
health

professionals must learn to live with ambiguity and
uncertainty. Our current rationalistic theory (I would
agree with Kass) abhors messiness, inexactitude,
ambiguity.

However, medicine and even more so,

biomedical

research,

especially

as it grows and

evolves and even succeeds as a science, often leaves
us confused,
clinically.

ethically

and politically,

and even

I was surprised and delighted with a

particularly disarming response to a recent Hastings
Center Report case study. The case study questions
the morality of the laboratory creation of transgenic
animals or transspecies

chimera.

Freedman

and

Goulet, in their commentary, readily concede that
such transspecies manipulation is not, as they put it,
"business as usual." To address this challenge, they
counsel that, "We will need to canvas our traditions,
religious and cultural as well as ethical, for clues ...
we will need to entertain and explore new principles
of reasoning,
commentary

too."

They

conclude

with the thought that,

their

"We are not

suggesting that transpecies manipulation be banned,
nor are we prepared
controlled.

to say how it should be

We are simply wondering

how we

should think about it. All that we are certain of is
how this inquiry should start: with somber awe." 24
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Freedman

and Goulet's

counsel

conclusion

to this paper.

Pellegrino's

rapprochement

is a fitting

between philosophical

hoped-for
ethics and

medicine is not yet complete. Current philosophical
ethics has proposed to medicine a framework of
values or theories
complex needs.
abstract

that does not fit medicine's

To make the fit, in addition to

theories

and principles

of rights

and

obligation, there is need to make accommodations for
the concrete, even the non-rational, for uncertainty,
for interconnectedness,

for virtue and character.

I

don't see the resolution of our dilemma to be an
either/or choice--rationalism versus non-rationalism.
And certainly dealing with dualisms is not new to
philosophy.

But like Freedman and Goulet, I think

that to further this rapprochement,
our traditions,
ethical;"

religious

we must "canvas

and cultural, as well as

we must "entertain

and explore new

principles of reasoning, too. "25
And in the meantime, I believe that I must re-examine
and broaden

what it is I am teaching

health

professionals.

I cannot portray current theories as

the whole and only truth. I cannot present the four
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prevailing principles (the "mantra" of bioethics as
Jonsen

calls

them)

of

bioethics--autonomy,

non maleficence, beneficence, and justice, as the full
and

adequate

armamentarium

that

professionals will need in daily practice.

health
The next

paper will be much more difficult than this first.
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WINTER

1991 PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

JanI8

Kent Baldner
Department of Philosophy, WMU
Ethics and Ecosystems
Friday. 3:00pm, 205 Bernhard Center

Jan 28

Christine Korsgaard
Philosophy, University of Chicago
Creating the Kingdom of Ends:
Responsibility
and Reciprocity
in Personal Relationships
Monday, 8pm. Olmsted Room
Mandelle Hall. Kalamazoo College

Feb 8

Janet Pisaneschi, Dean, College of
Health and Human Services, WMU
Virtue in the Health Professions
Friday. 3:00pm. 205 Bernhard Center

Feb 22

Rudolph Siebert
Department of Religion, WMU
Habermas's
Communicative

Ethics

Friday. 3:00pm, 205 Bernhard Center
MarI8

Lisa Newton, Director
Program in Applied Ethics
Fairfield University
How Valuable is the Environment?
Monday.

Mar 28

7:30pm. 3750 Knauss

Patrick Jenlink
Department of Educational Leadership, WMU
Ethical Leadership in Educational
Settings:
A Panel Discussion
Thursday 3:00pm.
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205 Bernhard Center

